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Abstract
The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power
indices measure the importance of a player in a coalitional game. We
consider a simple coalitional game called the spanning connectivity
game (SCG) based on an undirected, unweighted multigraph, where
edges are players. We examine the computational complexity of com-
puting the voting power indices of edges in the SCG. It is shown that
computing Banzhaf values and Shapley-Shubik indices is #P-complete
for SCGs. Interestingly, Holler indices and Deegan-Packel indices can
be computed in polynomial time. Among other results, it is proved
that Banzhaf indices can be computed in polynomial time for graphs
with bounded treewidth. It is also shown that for any reasonable
representation of a simple game, a polynomial time algorithm to com-
pute the Shapley-Shubik indices implies a polynomial time algorithm
to compute the Banzhaf indices. As a corollary, computing the Shap-
ley value is #P-complete for simple games represented by the set of
minimal winning coalitions, Threshold Network Flow Games, Vertex
Connectivity Games and Coalitional Skill Games.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the natural problem of computing the influence of
edges in keeping an unweighted and undirected multigraph connected. Game
theorists have studied notions of efficiency, fairness and stability extensively.
Therefore, it is only natural that when applications in computer science and
multiagent systems require fair and stable allocations, social choice theory
and cooperative game theory provide appropriate foundations. For example,
a network administrator with limited resources to maintain the links in the
network may decide to commit resources to links according to their connect-
ing ability. A spy network comprises communication channels. In order to
intercept messages on the channels, resources may be utilized according to
the ability of a channel to connect all groups. In a social network, we may be
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interested in checking which connections are more important in maintaining
connectivity and hence contribute more to social welfare.
Our model is based on undirected, unweighted and connected multigraphs.
All the nodes are treated equally, and the importance of a edge is based
solely on its ability to connect all the nodes. Using undirected edges is a
reasonable assumption in many cases. For example, in a social network,
relations are usually mutually formed.
We use a multigraph as a succinct representation of a simple coalitional
game called the spanning connectivity game (SCG). The players of the game
are the edges of the multigraph. The importance of an edge is measured
by computing its voting power index in the game. Voting power indices
including the Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik index are standard ways to
compute the importance of a player in a coalitional voting game. Intuitively,
the Banzhaf value is the number of coalitions in which a player plays a
critical role and the Shapley-Shubik index is the proportion of permutations
for which a player is pivotal.
The whole paper is concerned with computing solutions for SCGs. In Sec-
tion 2, a summary of related work is given. In Section 3, preliminary defini-
tions related to graph theory and coalitional games are given, and we define
SCGs. Section 4 presents hardness results for computing Banzhaf values
and Shapley-Shubik indices. In Section 5, positive computational results for
Banzhaf values and Shapley-Shubik indices are provided for certain graph
classes. Section 6 presents a polynomial-time algorithm to compute Holler
indices and Deegan-Packel indices. In Section 7, a summary of results is
given and future work is discussed.
2 Related work
Power indices such as the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices have been
extensively used to gauge the power of a player in different coalitional games
such as weighted voting games [18] and corporate networks [14]. These
indices have recently been used in network flow games [6], where the edges
in the graph have capacities and the power index of an edge signifies the
influence that an edge has in enabling a flow from the source to the sink.
Voting power indices have also been examined in vertex connectivity games
[9] on undirected, unweighted graphs; there the players are nodes, which are
partitioned into primary, standard, and backbone classes.
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The study of cooperative games in combinatorial domains is widespread in
operations research [12, 15]. Spanning network games have been examined
previously [20, 24] but they are treated differently, with weighted graphs
and nodes as players (not edges, as here). The SCG is related to the all-
terminal reliability model, a non-game-theoretic model that is relevant in
broadcasting [23, 11]. Whereas the reliability of a network concerns the
overall probability of a network being connected, this paper concentrates
on resource allocation to the edges. A game-theoretic approach can provide
fair and stable outcomes in a strategic setting.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Graph Theory
Definition 3.1. A multigraph G := (V,E, s) consists of a simple underlying
graph (V,E) with a multiplicity function s : E 7→ N where N is the set
of natural numbers excluding 0. Let |V | = n and |E| = m. For every
underlying edge i ∈ E, we have si edges in the multigraph. The multigraph
has a total of M =
∑
i∈E si edges.
Definition 3.2. A subgraph G′ = (V ′, E′) of a graph G = (V,E) is a graph
where V ′ is a subset of V and E′ is a subset of E such that the vertex set
of E′ is a subset of V ′. A subgraph H is a connected spanning subgraph of
a graph G if it is connected and has the same vertex set as G.
3.2 Coalitional Game Theory
Definition 3.3. A simple voting game is a pair (N, v) with characteristic
function v : 2N → {0, 1} where v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1 and v(S) ≤ v(T )
whenever S ⊆ T . A coalition S ⊆ N is winning if v(S) = 1 and losing
if v(S) = 0. A simple voting game can alternatively be defined as (N,W )
where W is the set of winning coalitions.
For the sake of brevity, we will abuse the notation to sometimes refer to game
(N, v) as v. For each connected multigraph (V,E, s), we define the SCG,
spanning connectivity game, (E, v) with players E and valuation function v,
defined as follows for S ⊆ E:
v(S) =
{
1, if there exists a spanning tree T = (V,E′) such that E′ ⊆ S
0, otherwise
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It is easy to see that the SCG (E, v) is a simple game because the outcome
is binary, v is monotone, v(∅) = 0 and v(E) = 1. We consider power indices
and cooperative game solutions for the edges in the SCG.
Definition 3.4. A player i is critical in a coalition S when v(S) = 1 and
v(S \ {i}) = 0. For each i ∈ N , we denote the number of coalitions in which
i is critical in game v by the Banzhaf value ηi(v). The Banzhaf Index of
player i in game v is
βi =
ηi(v)∑
i∈Nηi(v)
.
The Shapley-Shubik index is the proportion of permutations for which a
player is pivotal. For a permutation pi of N , the pi(i)th player is pivotal
if coalition {pi(1), . . . , pi(i − 1)} is losing but coalition {pi(1), . . . , pi(i)} is
winning.
Definition 3.5. The Shapley-Shubik (SS) value is the function κ that as-
signs to any simple game (N, v) and any voter i a value κi(v) where
κi =
∑
S⊆N
(|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)!(v(S) − v(S \ {i})).
The Shapley-Shubik (SS) index of i is defined by
φi =
κi
n!
.
The Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the normalized ver-
sions of the Banzhaf value and the Shapley-Shubik value respectively. Since
the denominator of the Shapley-Shubik index is fixed, computing the Shapley-
Shubik index and Shapley-Shubik value have the same complexity. This is
not necessarily true for the Banzhaf index and Banzhaf value.
4 Complexity of computing power indices
We define the problems of computing the power indices of the edges in the
SCG. For any power index X (e.g. Banzhaf value, Banzhaf index, Shapley-
Shubik index etc.) we define the problem SCG-X as follows:
Problem: SCG-X
Instance: Multigraph G
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Output: For the SCG corresponding to G, compute X for all the edges
We represent a communication network as a multigraph, where an edge
represents a connection that may or may not work. An edge is said to be
operational if it works. For a given graph G, the reliability Rel(G, {pi}) of G
is the probability that the operational edges form a connected spanning sub-
graph, given that each edge is operational with probability pi for i = 1, . . . m.
Problem: Rational Reliability Problem
Instance: Multigraph G and pi ∈ Q for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
Output: Compute Rel(G, {pi})
A special case of the reliability problem is when every edge has the same
probability p of being operational. This is called the Functional Reliabil-
ity Problem. A connected spanning subgraph with i edges will occur with
probability pi(1− p)m−i.
Definition 4.1. Let Ni be the number of connected spanning subgraphs
with i edges. Then the required output of the Functional Reliability Problem
is the reliability polynomial
Rel(G, p) =
m∑
i=0
Nip
i(1− p)m−i.
Problem: Functional Reliability Problem
Instance: Multigraph G
Output: Compute the coefficients Ni of the reliability polynomial for all i,
1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Ball [11] points out that an algorithm to solve the Rational Reliability Prob-
lem can be used as a sub-routine to compute all the coefficients for the Func-
tional Reliability Problem. Moreover he proved that computing the general
coefficient Ni is NP-hard and therefore computing the rational reliability
of a graph is NP-hard. As we will see in Section 5, reliability problems
have connections with computing power indices of SCG. We first prove that
SCG-BANZHAF-VALUE is #P-complete.
Proposition 4.2. SCG-BANZHAF-VALUE is #P-complete even for sim-
ple, bipartite and planar graphs.
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Proof. We present a reduction from the problem of counting connected span-
ning subgraphs. SCG-BANZHAF-VALUE is clearly in #P because a con-
nected spanning subgraph can be verified in polynomial time. It is known
that counting the total number of connected spanning subgraphs is #P-
complete even for simple, bipartite and planar graphs( [10], p. 305). We
now reduce the problem of computing the total number of connected span-
ning subgraphs to solving SCG-BANZHAF-VALUE. Take G = (V,E) with
n nodes andm edges. Transform graph G into G′ = (V ∪{n+1}, E∪{m+1})
by taking any node and connecting it to a new node via a new edge. Then
the number of spanning subgraphs in G is equal to the Banzhaf value of
edge m+ 1 in graph G′. This shows that SCG-BANZHAF-VALUE is #P-
complete.
Similarly, SCG-SS is #P-complete.
Proposition 4.3. SCG-SS is #P-complete even for simple graphs.
Proof. Let Ni be the number of connected spanning subgraphs of G with i
edges. We know that computing Ni is NP-hard [11]. We show that if there
is an algorithm polynomial in the number of edges to compute the Shapley-
Shubik index of all edges in the graph, then each Ni can be computed in
polynomial time.
We obtain graph G0 by the following transformation: for some node v ∈
V (G), we link it by a new edge x to a new node vx. Then, by the definition
of the Shapley-Shubik value,
∑m
r=0 r!Nr(|E(G)|−r)! =
∑m
r=0 r!N
′
r = κx(G0),
where we write N ′r for Nr(m− r)!, for all r.
Similarly we can construct Gi by adding a path Pi of length i to vx where
Pi has no edge or vertex intersection with G. Therefore
m∑
r=0
(r + i)!N ′r = κx(Gi). (1)
For i = 0, . . . ,m, we get an equation of the form of (1) for each Gi. The left-
hand side of the set of equations can be represented by an (m+1)× (m+1)
matrix A where Aij = (i+ j − 2)!. The set of equations is independent
because A has a non-zero determinant of (1!2! · · ·m!)2 (see e.g. Theorem
1.1 [4]). If there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute the Shapley-
Shubik index of each edge in a simple graph, then we can compute the
right-hand side of each equation corresponding to Gi.
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The biggest possible number in the equation is less than (2m)! and can be
represented efficiently. According to Stirling’s formula, m! ≈ √2pim (m
e
)m
,
the number (2m)! can be represented by km(log m) bits where k is a con-
stant. We can use Gaussian elimination to solve the set of linear equations
in O(m3) time. Moreover, each number that occurs in the algorithm can
also be stored in a number of bits quadratic of the input size (Theorem
4.10 [22]). Therefore SCG-SS is #P-complete.
A representation of a simple game is considered reasonable if, for a sim-
ple game (N, v), the new game (N ∪ {x}, v′) where v(S) = 1 if and only if
v′(S∪{x}) = 1, can also be represented. Then the proof technique in Propo-
sition 4.3 can be used to show that for any reasonable representation of the
simple game, a polynomial time algorithm to compute the Shapley-Shubik
indices implies a polynomial time algorithm to compute the Banzhaf in-
dices. This answers (positively) the question from [3] of whether computing
Shapley-Shubik indices for a simple game represented by the set of minimal
winning coalitions is NP-hard. As a corollary, we also strengthen or settle the
complexity of a number of coalitional games. The proof in Proposition 4.3
can be slightly modified to prove that computing the Shapley-Shubik index
(Shapley value in case of non-simple games) is #P-complete for a number
of games:
Proposition 4.4. Computing Shapley value is #P-complete for
1. Simple game represented by its minimal winning coalitions
2. Threshold Network Flow Games [8]
3. Vertex Connectivity Games [9]
4. STSG (Single Task Skill Game), TCSG (Task Count Skill Game),
WTSG (Weighted Task Skill Game), TCSG-T (Task Count Skill Game
with thresholds) and WTSG-T (Weighted Task Skill Game with thresh-
olds) [7]
Proof. For the given games, computing Banzhaf values is #P-complete. It
is easy to see that the games Threshold Network Flow Games, Vertex Con-
nectivity Games, STSG (Single Task Skill Game), TCSG-T (Task Count
Skill Game with thresholds) and WTSG-T (Weighted Task Skill Game with
thresholds) are simple games with reasonable representations. Also, TCSG
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(Task Count Skill Game) and WTSG (Weighted Task Skill Game) are gen-
eralizations of the STSG (Single Task Skill Game).
5 Polynomial time cases
In this section, we present polynomial time algorithms to compute voting
power indices for restricted graph classes including graphs with bounded
treewidth. We first consider the trivial case of a tree. If the graph G =
(N,E) is a tree then there is a total of n − 1 edges and only the grand
coalition of edges is a winning coalition. Therefore a tree is equivalent to
a unanimity game. This means that each edge has a Banzhaf index and
Shapley-Shubik index of 1
n−1 . In the case of the same tree structure but
with multiple parallel edges, we refer to this multigraph as a pseudo-tree.
Proposition 5.1. Let G = (N,E, s) be a pseudo-tree such that the under-
lying edges are 1, . . . ,m with multiplicities s1, . . . , sm. Then,
ηi1 =
m∏
j=1
j 6=i
(2sj − 1), and so βi1 =
ηi1∑m
k=1 skηk1
. (2)
Proof. Note that m = n− 1 in this case. Suppose edge i1 is a parallel edge
corresponding to edge i in the underlying graph. Edge i1 is critical for a
coalition C if the coalition C contains no edges parallel to i1 but contains
at least one sub-edge corresponding to each edge other than i. The number
of such coalitions is
∏m
j=1
j 6=i
(2sj − 1), which gives (2).
Proposition 5.2. Let G = (N,E, s) be a pseudo-tree such that the under-
lying edges are 1, . . . ,m with multiplicities s1, . . . , sm where s =
∑m
i=1 si.
Then the Shapley-Shubik indices can be computed in time polynomial in the
total number of edges.
Proof. Denote by er the coefficient of x
r in
∏
1≤j≤n−1
j 6=i
((1 + x)sj − 1).
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Then er is the number of coalitions with r edges which include at least one
parallel edge for each underlying edge j except i. Then, by definition of the
Shapley-Shubik value, for 1 ≤ k ≤ si,
κik(G) =
s−si∑
r=n−2
err!(s− r − si)!.
Thus, the Shapley-Shubik indices can be computed in time polynomial in
the total number of edges.
We now consider graphs with bounded treewidth. Note that trees and
pseudo-trees hve treewidth 1.
Definition 5.3. For a graph G = (V,E), a tree decomposition is a pair
(X,T ), where X = {X1, ...,Xn} ⊂ 2V , and T is a tree whose nodes are the
subsets Xi with the following properties:
1.
⋃
1≤i≤n Xi = V
2. For every edge (v,w) ∈ E, there is a subset Xi that contains both v
and w.
3. If Xi and Xj both contain a vertex v, then all nodes Xz of the tree in
the path between Xi and Xj also contain v.
The width of a tree decomposition is the size of its largest set Xi minus one.
The treewidth tw(G) of a graph G is the minimum width among all possible
tree decompositions of G.
Proposition 5.4. If the reliability polynomial defined in Definition 4.1 can
be computed in polynomial time, then the following problems can be computed
in time polynomial in the number of edges:
1. the number of connected spanning subgraphs;
2. the Banzhaf indices of edges.
Proof. We deal with each case separately.
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1. By definition, Ni is the number of connected spanning subgraph with
i edges. If all coefficients Ni are computable in polynomial time, then
the total number of connected spanning subgraphs
∑m
i=0 Ni is com-
putable in polynomial time.
2. We know that ηi(G) = 2ωi(G) − ω(G) (See [17]) where ω(G) is equal
to the total number of winning coalitions and ωi(G) is the number of
winning coalitions including player i. Consider the graph G where the
probability of edge i being operational is set to 1 whereas the probabil-
ity of other edges being operational is set to 0.5. Then the reliability
of the graph being connected is equal to the ratio of the number of
connected spanning subgraphs that include edge i to 2M−1, the total
number of subgraphs that include i. Therefore, ωi(v) the number of
connected spanning subgraphs including edge i can be computed in
polynomial time too.
Corollary 5.5. Banzhaf indices of edges can be computed in polynomial
time for graphs with bounded treewidth.
Proof. This follows from the polynomial time algorithm to compute the
reliability of a graph with treewidth k for some fixed k [2].
Definition 5.6. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with source s and sink t. Then
G is a series-parallel graph if it may be reduced to K2 by a sequence of the
following operations:
1. replacement of a pair of parallel edges by a single edge that connects
their common endpoints;
2. replacement of a pair of edges incident to a vertex of degree 2 other
than s or t by a single edge.
Graphs with bounded treewidth can be recognized in polynomial time [1].
Series-parallel graphs and 2-trees are well-known classes of graphs with con-
stant treewidth. Other graph classes with bounded treewidth are cactus
graphs and outer-planar graphs. We see that whereas computing Banzhaf
values of edges in general SCGs is NP-hard, important graph classes can be
recognized and their Banzhaf values computed in polynomial time.
When edges have special properties, their power indices may be easier to
compute. We define a bridge in the graph to be an edge whose removal
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results in the graph being disconnected. A graph class is hereditary if for
every graph in the class, every subgraph is also in the class.
Proposition 5.7. If graph G belongs to a hereditary graph class, for which
the reliability polynomial of a graph can be computed in polynomial time, then
the Shapley-Shubik index of a bridge can be computed in time polynomial in
the total number of edges.
Proof. Let graph G = (V,E) be a graph where edge k is a bridge which
connects two components A = (VA, EA) and B = (VB , EB). Then |E| =
|EA| + |EB | + 1. If the reliability polynomial of G can be computed in
polynomial time, then the reliability polynomial for each of the components
A and B can be computed. Then the Shapley-Shubik index of player k is:
φk(G) =
∑|EA|
i=|VA|−1
∑|EB|
j=|VB|−1
Ni(A)Nj(B)(i+ j)!(|EA|+ |EB | − i− j)!
|E|! .
Our next result is that if the reliability of a simple graph can be computed
then the Banzhaf indices of the corresponding multigraph can be computed.
A naive approach would be to compute the Banzhaf values of each edge
in a simple graph and then, for the corresponding parallel edges in the
multigraph, divide the Banzhaf value of the overall edge by the number of
parallel edges. However, as the following example shows, this approach is
incorrect:
Example 5.8. Let G = (V,E, s) be the multigraph in Figure 1. Then,
η41(vG) = 10, η11(vG) = 14, and η2(vG) = η3(vG) = 28. Therefore β41(vG) =
10
3×10+2×14+28+28 =
5
57
. Moreover, β11(vG) =
7
57
and β2(vG) = β3(vG) =
14
57
.
If we examine the underlying graph of G′ in Figure 1, then η4(v
′
G) = 4 and
η1(v
′
G) = η2(v
′
G) = η3(v
′
G) = 2 giving β4(G
′) = 2/5 and βi(G
′) = 1/5 for
i = 1, 2, 3. Therefore, the Banzhaf values of edges in the underlying graph
do not give a direct way of computing the Banzhaf values in the multigraph.
Lemma 5.9. If there is an algorithm to compute the reliability of the under-
lying simple graph, then the algorithm can be used to compute the reliability
of the corresponding multigraph.
Proof. Let G = (V,E, s) be a multigraph in which there are si parallel
edges i1, . . . , isi corresponding to edge i. Let pij be the probability that the
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Figure 1: Multigraph and its underlying graph
jth parallel edge of edge i is operational. In that case Rel(G, p) is equal
to Rel(G′, p′), where G′ is the corresponding simple graph of G and the
probability pi that edge i is operational is 1−
∏si
j=1(1− pij ).
We now prove in Proposition 5.10 that if there is an algorithm to compute
the reliability of the underlying simple graph G, then it can be used to
compute the Banzhaf indices of the edges in the corresponding multigraph
of G. It would appear that the proposition follows directly from Lemma 5.9
and Proposition 5.4. However, one needs to be careful that the reliability
computed is the reliability of the overall graph. Example 1 shows that
computing the Banzhaf values of the edges in the underlying simple graph
does not directly provide the Banzhaf values of the parallel edges in the
corresponding graph.
Proposition 5.10. For a multigraph G and edge i, let G′ be the multigraph
where all the other edges parallel to edge i are deleted. Then if the reliability
of G′ can be computed in polynomial time, then the Banzhaf value of edge i
in G can be computed directly by analysing G′.
Proof. Recall that G is a multigraph with a total of M edges. Given an
algorithm to compute the reliability of G′, we provide an algorithm to com-
pute the Banzhaf values of the parallel edges of edge i in G. For graph G′,
set the operational probabilities of all edges to 0.5 except i which has an
operation probability of 1− 0.5si . and compute the overall reliability r(G′)
of the graph. Then, by Lemma 5.9, ω(G) is 2Mr(G′).
Now for G′, set the operational probabilities of all edges to 0.5 except i
which has an operation probability of 1. Let the reliability of G′ with the
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new probabilities be r′(G′). We see that r′(G′) is equal to ωi(G
′)/2M−si .
Then ωi(G) = 2
si−1ωi(G
′) = 2M−1r′(G′). The Banzhaf value of i is then
2ωi(G)−ω(G). A similar approach gives Banzhaf values of other edges from
which all the Banzhaf indices can be computed.
6 Other power indices
Apart from the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices, there are other indices
which are also used. Both the Deegan-Packel index [16] and the Holler
index [21] are based on the notion of minimal winning coalitions. Minimal
winning coalitions are significant with respect to coalition formation. The
Holler index,Hi of a player i in a simple game is similar to the Banzhaf index
except that only swings in minimal winning coalitions contribute toward the
Holler index.
Definitions 6.1. Let Mi be {S ∈Wm : i ∈ S}. We define the Holler value
as |Mi|. The Holler index (also called the public good index ) is defined by
Hi(v) =
|Mi|∑
j∈N |Mj |
.
The Deegan Packel index for player i in voting game v is defined by
Di(v) =
1
|Wm|
∑
S∈Mi
1
|S| .
Proposition 6.2. For SCGs corresponding to multigraphs, Holler indices
and Deegan-Packel indices can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We use the fact that the number of trees in a multigraph can be
computed in polynomial time, which follows from Kirchhoff’s matrix tree
theorem [19]. Given a connected graph G with n vertices, let λ1, λ2, ..., λn−1
be the non-zero eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix of G (the Laplacian
matrix is the difference of the degree matrix and the adjacency matrix of
the graph). Kirchhoff proved that the number of spanning trees of G is equal
to any cofactor of the Laplacian matrix of G [19]: t(G) = 1
n
λ1λ2 · · · λn−1.
So now that we have a polynomial-time method to compute the number of
spanning trees t(G) of graph G, we claim this is sufficient to compute the
Holler values of the edges. If an edge i is a bridge, then it is present in every
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spanning tree and its Holler value is simply the total number of spanning
trees. If i is not a bridge thenMi = t(G)− t(G\e). Moreover, since the size
of every minimal winning coalition is the same, namely (n − 1), the Holler
indices and Deegan Packel Indices coincide for an SCG.
7 Conclusion
This paper examined fairness-based cooperative game solutions of SCGs, for
allocating resources to edges. In another recent paper, we have also looked
at the computation of stability based cooperative game solutions of SCGs.
A polynomial time algorithm is presented to compute the nucleolus. This is
a surprising result considering that the standard power indices are NP-hard
to compute and also that the SCG is not convex in general. Therefore, the
nucleolus may be a better alternative for resource allocation in SCGs.
We looked at the exact computation of power indices. In [5], an optimal
randomized algorithm to compute Banzhaf indices and Shapley-Shubik in-
dices with the required confidence interval and accuracy is presented. Since
the analysis in [5] is not limited to a specific representation of a coalitional
game, it can be used to approximate Banzhaf indices and Shapley-Shubik
indices in SCGs.
The results of the paper are summarized in Table 1. This framework can be
extended to give an ordering on the importance of nodes in the graph [13].
To convert a resource allocation to edges to one on nodes, the payoff for an
edge is divided equally between its two adjacent nodes. The total payoff of
a node is the sum of the payoffs it gets from all its adjacent edges. This
gives a way to quantify and compare the centrality or connecting role of each
node. It will be interesting to understand the properties of such orderings,
especially for unique cooperative solution concepts such as the nucleolus,
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices.
The complexity of computing the Shapley-Shubik index for an SCG with
a graph of bounded treewidth is open. If this problem is NP-hard, it will
answer the question posed in the conclusion of [5] on whether there are any
domains where computing one of the Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik
index is easy, whereas computing the other is hard.
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Table 1: Complexity of SCGs
Problem Input Complexity
SCG-BANZHAF-VALUE Simple, bipartite, planar graph #P-complete
SCG-BANZHAF-INDEX Simple graph ?
SCG-BANZHAF-(VALUE/INDEX) Multigraph with bounded treewidth P
SCG-SS Multigraph #P-complete
SCG-SS Multigraph with bounded treewidth ?
SCG-H-(VALUE/INDEX) Multigraph P
SCG-DP-(VALUE/INDEX) Multigraph P
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